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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Faretta v. 
California! established legal self-representation as a constitutionally 
guaranteed right in both state and federal cases. Since the 1975 
decision, concern has grown over the impact of pro se litigants on 
the legal system. This article focuses on one aspect of the pro se 
problem: the ways in which law libraries and law librarians can 
help pro se litigants who become law library patrons to achieve 
effective self-representation. After surveying the extent and nature 
of pro se use of law libraries, the article assesses the ways in which 
law librarians should respond to the needs of pro se patrons and 
the legal and ethical implications of the librarians' conduct. Con­
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crete institutional responses will be suggested to the problem 
posed by Faretta: How to achieve fairness in litigation when one 
party is not represented by counsel. 
II. LAW LIBRARIES AND PRO SE PATRONS 
A. 	 The Magnitude of Pro Se Use and the Traditional 
Law Library Response 
The extent to which pro se patrons make use of law libraries is 
difficult to assess. 2 Although no systematic study has been undertak­
en, data indicate that many law libraries receive requests for assis­
tance from pro se patrons. 3 Evidence of pro se library use is also 
available from the unsystematic impressions of law librarians who 
have occasionally reduced these impressions to writing. 4 Study of 
these sources allows one to conclude that pro se patronage, espe­
cially in urban areas,5 constitutes significant library use. These pa­
trons are either welcomed or permitted at a vast majority of law 
libraries6 and form a noticeable fraction of the user population. 
Measurements of the magnitude of pro se patronage must take 
into account the nature of library services required as well as the 
actual number of users. With few exceptions, pro se patrons have 
not received training in legal research. 7 As a result, their requests 
for librarian assistance are more frequent and are likely to be more 
time consuming than those. of other patrons. 8 With virtually no 
data available detailing the nature of pro se requests, one can only 
2. A pro se patron for the purposes of this discussion includes any library pa­
tron, not at the time represented by counsel, who seeks information about a personal 
legal problem. 
3. See Werner, Law Library Service to Prisoners-The Responsibility of Non­
prison Libraries, 63 LAW LIB. J. 231, 236-37 (1970), and Allen, Whom Shall We 
Serve: Secondary Patrons of the University Law School Library, 66 LAW LIB. J. 160 
( 1973). 
4. See, e.g., Begg, The Reference Librarian and the Pro Se Patron, 69 LAW LIB. 
J. 26 (1976). One should note that these reports may frequently be understated, for 
only a pro se patron who actively communicates that status to the librarian will be 
noticed. 
5. See Allen, supra note 3, at 160-61. 
6. ld. at 165. Private libraries are the exception to the general practice of per­
mitting pro se patronage. 
7. In the prison library context, many inmates develop significant legal research 
skills. Cj. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (a state may not prohibit prisoners 
from providing legal assistance to other prisoners in the absence of other alterna­
tives). 
8. One often detects a sense of librarian hostility to. such demands on library 
services. See Begg, supra note 4, at 30-32. 
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evaluate the potential costs involved in providing the requested as­
sistance. Recent figures indicate that law libraries spend roughly 55 
per cent of their overall budgets on personnel costs. 9 Since the 
only other major variable items in most library budgets are serials 
and new acquisitions, the trade-offs can become quite dramatic. 
The time spent in aiding pro se patrons must either directly reduce 
the time available to serve others or possibly result in reduced ac­
quisitions. 1o The need for the assistance of highly trained, non­
clerical law library personnel further exacerbates the demands that 
pro se patronage places on strained library resources. In view of 
these costs, it is not surprising that only a fraction of the requests 
for help that librarians receive from pro se patrons are fulfilled. 11 
The qualitative nature of the services requested by the pro se 
patron bears on the issue of the appropriate law library response. 
Often, these requests extend beyond the mere procurement of 
physical materials to assistance with legal analysis and argument. 
Law libraries have heretofore avoided the burdens of providing 
analytical services. 12 This institutional decision is formally acknowl­
edged in the American Association of Law Libraries Draft Code of 
Professional Responsibility and Ethics which states that: 
Law Librarians should refrain from unauthorized practice of law. 
This should be understood as: not to give legal advice or opin­
ion, or interpretation of statutes or court decisions. On the other 
hand, if requested both the text of the law and the court in­
terpretation of it, either in statutes or codes, or the decisions of 
the courts should be made available for everyone. 13 
9. P. SWORDS & F. WALWER, THE COSTS AND RESOURCES OF LEGAL EDUCA­
TION 218 (1974). 
10. It is assumed that there is not idle patron service capacity. One should 
further note that to employ an additional staff member may involve a quantum leap 
in expense. See Allen, supra note 3, at 168, where he states: 
[E]very single bit of service extended to secondary patrons (to the bar, to stu­
dents from other law schools, to taxpayers, etc.) is purchased at the expense 
of service to the primary patrons of the library, and that the law school stu­
dent and faculty member at the host institution is the loser. 
11. See Werner, supra note 3, at 237; Allen, supra note 3, at 170-71. 
12. See text accompanying notes 13-40 infra. 
13. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES DRAFT CODE OF ETHICS, art. 
III, § 2 (1974), [hereinafter cited as DRAFT CODE]. This draft code was voted upon 
at the 1975 Annual Convention of the American Association of Law Libraries. The 
draft, however, did not receive a majority endorsement and was withdrawn by the 
Ethics Committee for further re-working. A re-draft is to be ready in time for discus­
sion and vote at the Annual Convention scheduled for late June, 1978. Some type of 
statement on unautho~ized practice is expected to appear in this new draft. 
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Taken at face value, the Draft Code provides the basis upon 
which law libraries may seek to respond when the services re­
quested by the pro se patron require legal analysis. Even before 
the promulgation of the Draft Code, many individual law libraries, 
fearing liability for unauthorized practice of law, had made policy 
decisions not to provide analytical assistance in most cases. These 
policies were drawn with explicit recognition that "[l]aw library em­
ployes [sic] are cloaked with knowledge, and unsuspecting inquirers 
will believe what they tell them. Thus, there is a serious obligation 
to guide employees on how to react in various situations, and to em­
phasize the importance of weighing their actions carefully. "14 
One cannot realistically presume, however, that the underly­
ing problems are solved by the mere drafting of codes or policies. 
Initially, a line drawing problem appears. When should technical 
assistance in locating materials be denied so that the librarian need 
not fear slipping into the realm of analysis?15 Before attempting to 
define this line, one must first examine the premises underlying 
the Draft Code's ethical position. This is particularly true in light of 
the recognition, in Faretta, of the pro se right. 16 
B. 	 Debunking the Perceived Dilemma Regarding Legal 
Liability for Analytical Advice 
In assisting the unskilled law library user, law librarians fear 
that advice which goes beyond the mere provision of materials will 
result in legal liability for the unauthorized practice of law. This 
deep-seated fear is expressly articulated at two points in the Draft 
14. Panel Discussion, Ethical Problems of Law Librarianship, 67 LAW LIB. J. 
528, 531 (1974), [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion]. This problem is of modern 
origin. A previous authority had said, "The problem of reference or research work in 
the law library is less troublesome than might be supposed, for such work is usually 
done by the patron himself...." J. KAISER, LAW, LEGISLATIVE AND MUNICIPAL REF­
ERENCE LIBRARIES 10 (1914). 
15. 	 In the question and answer period following the panel discussion, supra 
note 14, the following question was asked by Ms. Elaine Teigler: 
The group that most disturbs me is the layman. The phrase in the code, 
"The Code and the Decisions should be made available," troubles me with 
this group. I ask the question: How do you point out the United States Code, 
bring him to it, take the index, and at least, point to his subject and say, 
"Now this is the index to the laws now in force in the United States, and be 
sure and use the pocket parts," without practising law? I feel if one gives 
him the chapter and the verse, you are almost consciously interpreting the 
Code. 
Panel Discussion, supra note 14, at 538. 
16. 	 See text accompanying notes 41-48 infra. 
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Code. 17 The perceived dilemma is also prominent in the litera­
ture. 1S One graphic account is as follows: 
A layman who appears in person to ask a question or who writes 
or telephones about one is a problem . . . . While he would 
hesitate to ask a medical library staff to diagnose a rash and 
fever, he does not hesitate to seek advice from the staff of a law 
library when the landlord threatens eviction. Such inquiries 
must be handled with tact and assistance in finding the desired 
information without actually interpreting the law. A reference 
librarian runs the danger of being accused of unlawful practice of 
the law or violation of professional ethics. 19 
A related fear, though less often expressed, is that liability 
may be imposed for negligent rendition of services. 2o Taken to­
gether, these fears give rise to the belief that the law librarian who 
gives more in-depth assistance than merely providing materials 
may be exposed to legal liability. 
Although pe~al law and tort law may provide sanctions for eg­
regious law librarian misbehavior, it is extremely unlikely that 
liability will flow from the types of assistance that are most often 
requested and occassionally given. In most cases, the perceived 
dilemma simply does not exist. Conduct by the librarian which 
exceeds the mere provision of legal materials does not become un­
authorized practice of law simply because it includes elements of 
analysis of content and probative worth. Similarly, tort liability, 
which must be founded on a breach of duty, cannot be imposed 
unless the librarian fails to exercise due care. Recognition of these 
legal realities does not help answer the normative question of how 
much assistance should be provided for the' pro se patron, but it 
does allow consideration of the problem without the hindrance of 
unfounded fears. 
Many cases involving criminal prosecutions for unauthorized 
practice contain dicta which define "practice of law" very broadly. 
For example, the Georgia Supreme Court has said that practice of 
law is "not confined to practice in the courts of this state, but [is] 
of [a] larger scope, including ... the giving of any legal advice, 
and any action taken for others in any matter connected with the 
17. DRAFT CODE, supra note 13, art. III, § 2; art. VII, § 1. 
18. See note 15 supra; cf. Fiordalisi, Law Library Services to the Community, 
46 LAW Lis. J. 448, 450-51 (1953) (indicating the need to avoid impinging on the 
prerogatives of the organized bar). 
19. Heckel, Service to Readers, 11 LIB. TRENDS 271,275-76 (1963). 
20. See text accompanying notes 31-37 infra. 
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law. "21 Similarly, an earlier Illinois decision involving criminal 
prosecution for unauthorized practice, in dicta, found the prac­
tice of law to include "the giving of advice or rendering services 
requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge."22 Standing alone, 
these dicta suggest that many acts undertaken by law librarians 
amount to the unauthorized practice of law. By providing the pro 
se patron with the relevant statutes and cases, the law librarian has 
rendered services requiring some degree of legal skill or know­
ledge. The same conduct amounts to action taken for others in a 
"matter connected with the law." But the absurdity of defining 
those acts as the practice of law is patent. Such services, while 
skilled and meaningful, are not the unauthorized practice of law. 
Once one recognizes that these dicta sweep far too broadly, 
the search for a functional definition of unauthorized practice of law 
reveals two major elements. First, the relationship between the 
unauthorized practitioner and client usually has a remunerative as­
pect. 23 Second, the services rendered involve either preparation of 
a physical work product or representation in some sort of transac­
tion or forum. 24 Measured against these more concrete functional 
tests, it becomes apparent that' significant legal research assistance 
does not amount to the unauthorized practice of law. Activities 
such as explaining the commands contained in a summons, direct­
ing the patron to those rules of court which explain how the sum­
mons can be resisted, expressing opinions about the relevance of a 
particular source, or simply informing the patron that the position 
that he or she is seeking to adopt has been foreclosed by statute or 
case law do not involve remuneration, representation, or the prep­
aration of a work product. 25 Although they constitute examples of 
21. Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 519,162 S.E. 796, 800 (1932) (Ina slightly 
atypical case, the state solicitor general sought to enjoin defendants from applying 
for authorization to practice law). 
22. People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,474, 176 N.E. 901, 
907 (1931). 
23. See J. FISHER & D. LACHMANN, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK 140 
(1972) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. 
24. [d. at 132; cf. Note, Legal Paraprofessionals and Unauthorized Practice, 8 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 104, 106-07 (1973) (a discussion of the applicability of unau­
thorized practice statutes to legal paraprofessional activities). 
25. Those engaged in other professions perform similar functions. For example: 
Social workers in public assistance may already be required to practice law 
as substantially as if they were in a courtroom. In making an initial determi­
nation of an applicant's eligibility, the public assistance worker must com­
plete the applicant's financial statement. "Every question, or nearly every 
question, on the financial statement, is a legal question. When the social 
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librarian conduct beyond the scope of the Draft Code, they do not 
constitute unauthorized practice of law. This view is confirmed by 
research efforts which failed to find a single reported case in which 
a law librarian has been prosecuted for unauthorized practice in the 
last thirty years. 26 
A more realistic fear is that the librarian who assists pro se 
patrons will be invading areas that lawyers regard as their exclusive 
domain, even though the assistance provided does not amount to 
the practice of law. Consider an encounter with a pro se patron 
who begins his use of the law library by relating his legal problem 
to the law librarian. Rather than blandly suggesting what materials 
are available and describing how they can be used, the librarian 
does some preliminary research and gives the patron citations to 
relevant statutes and common law precedents as well as the most 
recent survey of the topic in the jurisdiction. While reading the 
literature provided, the patron poses several questions concerning 
legal terminology. These terms are clarified by the librarian; thus 
simple legal concepts are indirectly explained. No remuneration is 
requested, no document is prepared, no intercession on behalf of 
the patron is performed, and no particular course of action is sug­
gested. While unauthorized practice of law has not occurred, the li­
brarian's conduct has been substituted for legal research services 
worker advises, or even discusses the questions or answers, he may very 
likely be giving legal advice." The private social worker who advises an ap­
plicant that he should apply, how to apply, what to answer and how to ap­
peal if the application is rejected is also giving "legal" advice. When he 
argues ... on behalf of the applicant, he is giving representation. When and 
if he goes to a hearing on behalf of the applicant, he is surely engaging in 
advocacy. 
Sparer, Thorkelson, & Weiss, The Lay Advocate, 43 U. DET. L.J. 493,499-500 (1966) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Downs, Providing the Social Worker with Legal Under­
standing: Specific Need, HEW CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, THE EXTENSION OF 
LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR 141 (1964». 
26. See HANDBOOK, supra note 23. No cases were found in which there was 
any indication that the basis for the charges related to activities of a law librarian. 
See also Letter from Professor J. Myron Jacobstein to the authors (December 19, 
1977) (on file with Western New England Law Review). Professor Jacobstein, of Stan­
ford Law School, confirms the position of the authors on the basis of his own inde­
pendent research. Additional research techniques were employed which would not 
necessarily identify cases in which the charged individual was coincidentally a law 
librarian. No effort was made to extend the additional search beyond the most recent 
thirty years. It should be noted that legal research firms or paralegals now regularly 
do major research and analytical work. These firms and paralegals are employed by 
attorneys who in turn bill the expense (and then some) to clients. See generally 
Bailey, Kleeman, & Ring, Paralegal Functions and Legal Constraints, 9 CLEARING­
HOUSE REV. 851 (1976). 
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traditionally performed by attorneys. Although these services are 
usually rendered in conjunction with providing advice, they do 
provide a segment ofattorney income. Because law librarians view 
maintenance of good working relations with the bar as essential, 
they are inclined to avoid such potential conflicts with attorney 
services. 
Attorneys are easily the most important patron class27 and can 
strongly influence the tone of the working environment in the law 
library. More fundamentally, a significant number of law libraries 
are sponsored or funded by the organized bar. 28 In those libraries, 
job security might well be linked to a policy of noninterference 
with attorney prerogatives. To the argument that once an indi­
vidual has elected to proceed pro se no attorney is deprived of a 
client, the bar can respond that, if left unaided, the pro se patron 
might quickly recognize the need for counsel. Similarly, the avail­
, ability of Significant law librarian aid may influence the original deci­
sion whether or not to proceed pro se. 29 
On balance, a pragmatic view counsels law librarians to avoid 
providing services to pro se patrons which significantly overlap 
those areas of assistance which frequently generate counsel fees. 
Although in most cases this means that the librarian should not 
supervise or direct the whole course of research to be undertaken, 
it does not rule out qualitative, analytical, or even interpretive ad­
vice. A librarian does not overstep externally erected30 professional 
barriers by narrowing or redirecting research efforts, expressing 
views about the weight to be given to various authorities, or engag­
ing in similar activities. 
Fear of tort liability is advanced as the second major reason to 
limit assistance to patrons. Proceeding from a premise of "safety 
first," one may assume that the law librarian should give no ser­
vices except those involved in keeping the collection up-to-date, 
the doors open, the floors nonslippery, and the reading room free 
27. See Allen, supra note 3, at 164. 
28. See generally, McGuirl, Summary of the Survey of Law Libraries Serving a 
Local Bar, 65 LAW LIB. J. 244 (1972). 
29. This is very speculative. It is doubtful that most potential consumers of 
legal services would be at all aware of the practices of law libraries. Compare with 
text accompanying notes 79-81 infra, and materials cited therein. 
30. Internally imposed barriers may exist. The purpose of the present discus­
sion is to explain that the existing barriers to expanded service to pro se patrons are 
those which law librarians impose upon themselves. Consequently, the barriers 
should be independently justified without reference to external pressures such as the 
fear of legal sanctions.. 
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of pneumonia-inducing drafts. Tort law imposes liability for breach 
of duty; if no duty is owed, none can be breached. The law librar­
ian owes duties regarding the maintenance of the collection, such 
as proper filing of looseleaf supplements, or warnings when s~ch 
supple~entation is incomplete. In addition, the law librarian's 
duties of due care31 extend to the performance of all general library 
functions. 32 No legal duty is owed to assist the pro se patron. Thus, 
if no services are extended to such patrons beyond the traditional 
bibliographic ones set forth in Draft Code of Ethics, no tort liability 
can follow. 33 
Of course, if one does choose to act when there is no duty to 
do so, one must use due care. 34 The law librarian who attempts to 
aid the pro se patron must be reasonably careful, clear, and 
thorough. While all assistance given by law librarians theoretically 
involves some risk of tort liability if not done with due care, that 
risk of liability may be significantly greater dealing with pro se pa­
trons than dealing with legally sophisticated patrons. What the law 
librarians perceive as a likelihood of pro se patron reliance35 trans­
31. Tort law has long debated whether duties of due care are owed generally, 
or whether they are only owed to those who might be foreseeably injured by the 
conduct involved. Compare, Chief Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Is­
land RR, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), with the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Andrews, id. at 347, 162 N.E. at 101. The distinction is 'unimportant for purposes of 
the present discussion as the entire patron population is forseeably within the zone 
of danger created by negligent law Iibrarianship. 
32. There are also some foreseeable special functions which are to be per­
formed by the law librarian. The reference interview of a patron may involve learn­
ing details of the patron's private life. See DRAFT CODE, supra note 13, art. III, § 4. 
In this regard, improper disclosure by the law librarian of the confidential material 
might result in tort liability. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 802-18 
(4th ed. 1971). 
33. Tort liability of law librarians is as unlikely as liability for unauthorized 
. practice. See notes 19-24 supra and accompanying text. The only reported tort Iitiga" 
tion involved a claim by a patron of a public law library who attacked its limited 
hours of operation as a civil rights violation. Wright v. Lane County Comm'rs, 459 
F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1972). See also, Panel Discussion, An Ethical Code for Law 
Librarianship?, 62 LAW LIB. J. 409, 417 (1969), which contains a fleeting reference 
to the possible purchases of reference librarian malpractice insurance; Angoff, Li­
brary Malpractice Suit, Could It Happen to You?, 7 AM. LIB. 489 (1976) (hypotheti­
cal example); cf. Wade, Tort Liability of Paralegals and Lawyers Who Utilize Their 
Services, 24 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1150 (1971) (potential liability of paralegals and the 
attorneys who employ them is "well defined," "controllable" and justified by the ben­
efits to the legal profession and the public). For a discussion of due care'in legal 
research by attorneys, see Toward a Standard of Care in Legal Research, 2 GLEN­
DALE L. REV. 63 (1977). 
34. See generally 57 AM. JUR. 2d Negligence §§ 45, 74 (1971); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). 
35. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra. 
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lates into an element of the tort inquiry.36 The foreseeable reliance 
of the pro se patron upon law librarian advice opens the door to 
liability if poor advice results in loss of the pro se litigation which 
otherwise would have succeeded. In contrast, giving bad research 
advice to attorneys or others trained in legal research and legal 
principles is far less likely to bear a requisite link to any sub­
sequent injury for the imposition of tort liability.37 
The obvious and basic principle that should guide librarian ac­
tion is the attentive exercise of due care in giving advice to pro se 
patrons regardless of the kind or amount of advice given. The more 
important precept is that librarians must recognize the limits of 
their skill and training. Not all law librarians possess law degrees38 
and not all law library staff are trained legal researchers.39 For 
those who lack the expertise needed to provide even basic legal 
research assistance, the realistic fear of tort liability is a significant 
internal barrier to automatically giving broader aid to all pro se 
patrons. It does not follow, however, that such aid is to be refused 
in all or even most cases by the increasing number of law librarians 
who do possess significant legal skills. 40 In view of the social need 
for fairness in the administration of justice, a need which our sys­
tem has heretofore addressed by attempting to secure access to 
competent legal counsel for all parties, those law librarians must 
consider on a clean slate the nature and type of aid to be given. 
While librarians should exercise due care, they should also stand 
ready to provide meaningful aid to pro se patrons. 
III. THE ADEQUACY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
A. The Societal Considerations 
In Faretta,41 the right to proceed pro se received full judicial 
recognition for the first time. Prior to that decision, the unqualified 
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, comment C (l965); See 
also Wade, supra note 33, at 1135. 
37. One notable exception may arise from the library practice of providing 
telephone reference service for attorneys or others. If, in responding to an attorney's 
request regarding the appropriate limitations period to be applied in a specific cause 
of action, a mere misstatement of the applicable statute is made, the misinformation 
might provide a basis for librarian liability. 
38. See Price & Kitchen, Degree-Oriented Study Among Law Librarians, 64 
LAW LIB. J. 29 (1971). 
39. Id. at 30-32. 
40. Id. at 29. 
41. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
57 1978] RESPONSE TO THE PRO SE PATRON 
right to self-representation had been criticized as a source of un­
fairness in our judicial system. For example, Professor Grano, re­
ferring to pro se representation in criminal cases, urged that: 
A strong and just government must supervise and restrict its 
own behavior to assure its continued strength and popular sup­
port, which depend, to some extent, on protecting the security 
of the rest of the members of the community. This security is 
maintained only if the community is convinced that the govern­
ment will not deprive anyone of his rights except by methods 
objectively fair. Therefore, the government must have the right 
to demand that it not deviate from certain standards, even if the 
individual proceeded against would see no transgression. 42 
On the other side, the Supreme Court, in dicta, favored the cause 
of the would be pro se litigant on a number of occasions. 43 Despite 
these differences, all involved in the debate have always recognized 
that the government has a strong interest in achieving fairness in 
the administration of both criminal and civil justice. To the extent 
that pro se representation is less effective than representation by 
counsel, fairness is jeopardized. After the Faretta decision, the 
societal interest in fairness must either be ignored or protected by 
means other than the forced representation by counsel. 
Effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental means by 
which American jurisprudence has traditionally protected the ob­
jective fairness of the criminal system. Commentators have often 
observed that adequate legal representation is a prerequisite to en­
joyment of constitutional protections. 44 Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court has deemed legal representation a fundamental 
right, requiring that assistance of counsel be available in all felony45 
42. See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 
54 MINN. L. REV. 1175 (1970): 
In the modern era it is not always fully understood that the adversary system 
performs a vital social function and is the product of long historical experi­
ence. The state trials in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England dem­
onstrated that a system of justice that provides inadequate opportunities to 
challenge official decisions is not only productive of injuries to individuals, 
but is itself a threat to the state's security and to the larger interests of the 
community. 
Id. at 1196 n.114 (quoting REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON 
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 10 (1963». 
43. See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rei. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80 
(1942) (dicta recognizing the "right to dispense with a lawyer's help"). 
44. See generally Kamisar, The Right to Counsel, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962). 
45. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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and misdemeanor cases. 46 Moreover, as the scope of collateral re­
view of convictions in criminal cases is in a period of rapid contrac­
tion,47 rigorous compliance with technical and procedural require­
ments is necessary to fully protect a defendant's constitutional 
rights. Viewed in this light, "Faretta presents the possibility of a 
pro se representation shockingly inferior to what may be expected 
of the prosecution. "48 . 
Although civil cases also rely on adversary presentation, the 
societal interest in insuring the relative equality of legal representa­
tion is not as strong. Unlike a criminal prosecution, the govern­
ment is not the prime mover of the civil process; hence, there is 
less fear of institutional unfairness. The rights which may· be 
eclipsed by poor representation and adverse judgments are, at least 
theoretically, not as significant as a deprivation of liberty. Despite 
these differences, it is important that all citizens have a fundamen­
tal right of access to civil courts which are procedurally fair. The 
appropriate use of those courts should be encouraged by a reputa­
tion for doing justice. In addition, judicial efficiency is furthered by 
the proficient preparation and presentation of civil cases by those 
trained in the law and rules of procedure. Therefore, in civil dis­
putes as well as criminal cases, courts have traditionally relied on 
the skill and knowledge of lawyers to make the system work effi­
ciently and fairly. 
B. 	 Toward a Concept of Minimally Adequate Legal 
Representation 
The immediately preceding discussion summarized the soci­
etal interest in adequate representatipn which is endangered by the 
creation in F aretta of an absolute right to proceed pro se. 49 From 
the perspective of the accused who is handling his or her own case, 
46. 	 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
47. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 
233 (1973). For an excellent discussion of these cases, see Cover & Aleinikoff, Dia­
lectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1072-77, 1100­
02 (1977). 
48. Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 86 
YALE L.J. 292, 293 (1976) [hereinafter cited as YALE Note]. 
49. But cf. Robbins & Herman, Pro Se Litigation, Litigating Without Counsel: 
Faretta or For Worse, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 629, 631 (1976) (post conviction crimi­
nal defendants and civil litigants are not constitutionally entitled to free counsel; 
Faretta, however, should not be interpreted to prohibit the court from appointing 
counsel to such litigants when they request assistance). 
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society's responsibility is to provide conditions under which pro se 
representation will be constitutionally adequate. Just as access to 
transcripts became a part of adequate representation, 50 it seems 
clear that access to other types of materials may be essential to 
minimally adequate self-representation. 51 . 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Faretta recog­
nized that inadequate pro se representation may frequently oc­
cur. 52 In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger contended that the 
paramount constitutional right to be protected is the right of the 
"fullest possible defense. "53 The majority reasoned that "assistance" 
in preparing a defense is the essence of due process and that un­
wanted counsel is not assistance. 54 At a minimum, both positions 
include the concept that the Constitution commands that some 
assistance be available to criminal defendants. 55 Since counsel can 
no longer be imposed on an unwilling party, possible alternative 
sources of this constitutionally mandated assistance.must be ex­
amined. 
Another recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, 
Bounds v. Smith, 56 provides a starting point from which to analyze 
the problem. In that case, state prison inmates successfully main­
tained a federal civil rights action under section 1983,57 claiming that 
their constitutional right of access to the courts was denied by the 
state's failure to provide adequate prison law libraries. Proceeding 
from a premise that "[i]t is now established beyond doubt that 
50. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
51. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
52. The facts in Faretta indicate that the trial judge refused to allow Faretta to 
proceed pro se because he lacked the knowledge and skill necessary to achieve even 
arguably effective self-representation. 422 U.S. at 808 n.3. 
53. 422 U.S. at 840. 
54. ld. at 832-33. 
55. Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that a state is not required 
by due process to provide free counsel for indigent criminal defendants seeking dis­
cretionary appeals). The arguments advanced in this section will address pro se crim­
inal litigation. It is acknowledged that there is no analogous constitutional under­
pinning for similar arguments in civil cases. For a discussion of the civil litigant's 
interests see text accompanying notes 41-48 supra. 
56. 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus­
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
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prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts, "58 the 
majority noted that prior Supreme Court decisions had "required 
remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the courts is 
adequate, effective and meaningful. "59 The Court affirmed the rul­
ing below which required establishment of "adequate law libraries 
or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. "60 The 
analogy between meaningful inmate access to legal materials and 
the minimal level of assistance to be given pro se litigants, while 
imperfect, is still fruitful. The due process concern in Bounds v. 
Smith clearly suggests that a post-Faretta decision to forego the aid 
of counsel should not be interpreted as a waiver of all claims to 
effective participation in the litigation process. 61 To find that a 
non incarcerated pro se defendant has a lesser right of access to 
legal reference materials than a person who has already suffered 
conviction and incarceration would be anomalous. 
Several concrete steps have been taken which attempt to give 
substance to the access concept central to Bounds v. Smith. Even 
before that decision, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Avery62 had 
struck down a prison regulation that prohibited inmates from assist­
ing one another with legal matters. The Johnson opinion was based 
on the recognition that many inmates were "unable themselves, 
with reasonable adequacy, to prepare their petitions."63 More re­
cently, the American Association of Law Libraries published a 
manual designed to help train prison library workers to give legal 
research assistance to inmates. This manual states that prison law 
librarians "can help inmates find the material they need and when 
necessary, show them how the books are used."64 Most recently, in 
Bounds v. Smith, the Court cited with favor the provision of "profes­
sional or quasi-professional legal assistance to prisoners. "65 Taken 
58. 430 U.S. at 821. Cj. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (declaring invalid 
a Tennessee state prison regulation forbidding prisoners to assist one another in pre­
paring writs). 
59. 430 U.S. at 823. 
60. Id. at 828 (footnote omitted). 
61. Cj. YALE Note, supra note 48 at 307-08 (proposing a "standby counsel" be 
appointed for jailed pro se defendants who otherwise have little opportunity to prepare 
a defense). 
62. 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
63. Id. at 489 (emphasis supplied). But cf. Hackin v. Arizona, 102 Ariz. 218, 
220, 427 P.2d 910, 911-12, appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 143 (1967) (although a prisoner 
may need the help of others to prepare a writ of habeas corpus, "[tlhe matter is then 
in the hands of the court which is well acquainted with the law, and whose duty it is 
to determine the legality of the petitioner's detention"). 
64. O. WERNER, MANUAL FOR PRISON LAW LIBRARIES 1 (1976). 
65. 430 U.S. at 830. See text accompanying notes 20-21 & 33 supra. 
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as a whole, these precedents and institutional developments signal 
a strong concern that legal self-representation should not be ren­
dered ineffective by the pro se litigant's individual lack of knowl­
edge or expertise. 
C. 	 Alternatives to the Effective Assistance of Counsel 
There are many ways to help pro se litigants prepare and pre­
sent their cases effectively. Primary among these are various forms 
of nonrepresentational assistance of counsel and differing types of 
paralegal services. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Faretta, took 
the position that unwanted counsel is more effective than no coun­
sel at all. 66 Even in a noncooperative setting, counsel can guaran­
tee that the judicial system take cognizance of the party's legal 
rights. Briefs can be filed, the admissibility of evidence can be 
challenged, and inadvertent waivers of legal rights by procedural 
default can be avoided. 67 One commentator, expanding on these 
suggestions, has urged the appointment of "standby counsel" whose 
role would be determined in accord with the wishes of the pro se 
defendant, especially the jailed pro se defendant: "[T]he defendant 
may request that standby counsel transmit to the court requests for 
investigative, expert, and other services, that he take part in the 
plea-bargaining process, or that he participate in pretrial hear­
ings. "68 Another commentator has developed a comprehensive 
model of "hybrid representation" which includes the required ap­
pointment of counsel and encouragement to the pro se defendant 
to "make active use of counsel [while preserving] his [the litigant's] 
dignity and freedom of choice...."69 This type of model has re­
ceived at least some judicial support7° and arguably strikes a satis­
fYing balance between the policies implicit in the right to counsel 
cases71 and those underlying Faretta. Especially important is the 
66. 	 422 U.s. at 846 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
67. Cj. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 47 (waivers of legal rights by default as 
a result of attorney error may unfairly penalize defendants who are powerless to 
prevent or to defend against such failures). 
68. 	 YALE Note, supra note 48, at 308 (footnotes omitted). 
69. Note, Assistance of Counsel: A Right to Hybrid Representation, 57 B. U. L. 
REV. 370, 584 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hybrid Note]. 
70. 	 Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 
U.S. 976, aff'd on rehearing, 437 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Grow, 
394 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); Bayless v. United States, 
381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967). 
71. 	 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963). 
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claimed ability of hybrid representation to protect the orderliness 
of the trial process and the impartial role of the trial judge. 72 
Any of the above plans can provide some legal assistance to 
the pro se litigant and thereby help to protect the interest of soci­
ety in insuring at least minimally adequate representation. Yet 
neither these plans nor the systematic assistance of paralegal aid 
are widely available to pro se criminal defendants. In addition, sys­
tematic legal assistance is usually associated only with criminal 
cases. As noted before, society has a vital interest in fair and effi­
cient civil litigation. Consequently, there is an institutional void; 
some criminal pro se litigants and virtually all civil pro se litigants 
receive no legal assistance at all. Law libraries and law librarians 
can help fill the void. 
Although no reliable statistics are available, it is reasonable to 
assume that most pro se litigants will seek out a source of legal 
information and thus be referred to a library containing a signifi­
cant collection of legal materials. 73 Previous writers on pro se li­
brary patrons have assumed that the pro se user is likely to solicit 
the aid of the library staff. 74 Further, since many law libraries are 
restricted access libraries, patron identification and reference inter­
view procedures can alert the librarian to pro se library use. In this 
manner, a prerequisite for institutional response to the pro se liti­
gant is met: the party in need of assistance has been identified to 
the party able to provide assistance. 
Apart from being well situated to identify those in need of 
their assistance, law librarians are generally well equipped to pro­
vide specialized services. Virtually all law librarians are college edu­
cated, most have at least one advanced degree, and a growing num­
ber have law degrees. 75 More important, virtually all law librarians 
have experience in legal bibliography and research techniques. In 
many university settings, they are given responsibility for providing 
students with legal research instruction. The exercise of biblio­
graphic and research skills on behalf of the pro se patron, while not 
a panacea, is a vital step beyond the bland provision of materials 
envisioned by the Draft Code and beyond the constraints imposed 
72. _ See Hybrid Note, supra note 69, at 584. 
73. The obvious exception is the inmate population prior to the widespread 
implementation of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). . 
74. See Begg, supra note 4, at 26-27. 
75. See Price & Kitchen, supra note 38, at 29. For an interesting historical 
sidelight see W. ROALFE, LIBRARIES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1953). 
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by unfounded fears of legal liability. 76 
Librarians' bibliographic skills can be utilized to the advantage 
of the pro se patron by providing compilations of materials in the 
collection which bear on a particular genre of problems. These 
compilations may include annotations which indicate the techniques 
by which materials can be used to maximum advantage, or those 
which explain how kindred material is located. Although it is un­
realistic to expect an uninitiated pro se patron to resort to 
Shepard's Citations to insure the continued vitality of precedents, 
it is quite realistic to suggest that law librarians can easily make 
this knowledge available. Similarly, indicating to a pro se patron 
the relative value as a research tool of annotated collections of stat­
utes, as opposed to mere compilations of laws, is simple and yet 
invaluable. Finally, a law librarian can explain the role of legislative 
history in statutory interpretation to the pro se patron or tell the 
patron that there are other code sections relevant to solution of the 
particular problem. 
These few examples were deliberately chosen for their want of 
sophistication. Once law librarians agree that such reference ser­
vices are to be provided, they must decide where to draw the line. 
As the reference inquiry becomes more clearly focused, the distinc­
tion between search and solution, between provision of materials 
and substantive legal analysis, blurs. 77 Relieved of the unjustified 
fear that detailed reference help amounts to the unauthorized 
practice of law, the librarian should feel free to give as much aid as 
individual conscience and expertise dictate. Such a response con­
trasts markedly with the traditional law librarian solution which 
stopped well short of detailed aid, limiting service to provision of 
basic materials. 78 
76. Cf. Ginger & Macleod, The Rights of the People and the Role of Librar­
ians, 19 LIB. TRENDS 96 (1970) (Public, academic, and law librarians "can perform a 
valuable service for both their patrons and the democracy of our country by recogniz­
ing the importance of the people's need to know their rights, and by providing them 
with the necessary materials and information"). 
77. See note 15 supra. 
78. "The advice given in some library schools and in the past (lead the patron 
with a legal problem to the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, then walk away fast 
before he can ask you for more help) is inadequate for today's society." Ginger & 
Macleod, supra note 76, at 96. At a recent conference designed to familiarize public 
and academic librarians with legal materials, the traditional solution was echoed. In 
response to the question "[aJre there any problems when a librarian answers legal 
questions?" one of the conference speakers answered "[d]on't give legal advice that 
could be dangerous. Just point them toward the tools." Norton, LEX: Law Advice for 
Public & Academic Librarians, 103 LIB. J. 313, 314 (1978). 
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One obvious drawback to a highly individualized response to 
the legal research needs of the pro se patron is time and expense. 
Service to pro se patrons can significantly interfere with service to 
attorneys, whom the law library defines as its primary clientele. 
Such responses, moreover, are no substitute for a broader institu­
tional solution. Since law libraries are not equally equipped to pro­
vide legal research expertise, the burden of such services will fall 
dispropmtionately on those libraries located in population centers 
where pro se representation is more frequene9 or on those li­
braries which hold themselves outs° or come to be known for the 
research assistance provided. 81 To insure that most pro se patrons 
will receive meaningful assistance, more general solutions must be 
devised. 
At a preliminary level, materials should be prepared which in­
troduce the inexperienced legal researcher to the law library. For 
. example, a videotape or audio-cassette tour of the law library, de­
scribing the location and use of fundamental segments of the collec­
tion, could be produced. Alternatively, or in addition, walking 
tours of the library can be publicized and provided at times found 
to be convenient to pro se litigants. Similar materials or presenta­
tions can be made available which delineate basic research tech­
niques and search methodology. These programs would be econom­
ical: patrons would be introduced to the library and informed of 
the location of materials without the use of individualized librarian 
assistance. 
At the next level, a law library can solicit outside assistance to 
expand its force of legally trained personnel willing to aid pro se 
litigants. The law librarian can ask the local bar association to pro­
vide volunteers to conduct seminars on substantive topics of recur­
ring concern such as landlord-tenant law, effective use of small 
claims court, and the basics of local court procedure. Similarly, the 
organized bar and area law schools may be asked to provide volun­
teers to assist individual pro se patrons in legal research. Although 
these steps cannot guarantee adequate pro se representation in 
every case, they are fundamental. They would represent an institu­
79. Allen, supra note 3, at 160-61. 
80. Cf. Ginger & Macleod, supra note 76, at 102 (Legal collections for layper­
sons should be publicized through newsletters, newspaper articles, exhibits, bibliog­
raphies, and lectures; "The right to justice must be advertised ... if there is to be 
justice in the land"). 
81. But cf. Begg, supra note 4, at 31 (ways to discourage requests for research 
assistance and minimize the problems presented by the pro se patron), 
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tional recognition of the need to serve a larger constituency. By 
taking the initiative, law libraries can tacitly acknowledge a new 
82role for themselves in the post-Faretta era.
An enlarged institutional response could encourage a corre­
spondingly enlarged assumption of responsibility by librarians and 
staff members for giving the pro se patron extensive individual aid. 
One can imagine a law librarian delving deeply into the details of a 
problem and guiding the research to an informed conclusion. Such 
a course of action, however, in addition to being extremely bur­
densome on library personnel and jeopardizing service to attor­
neys, may raise the problem of discrimination among patrons. 
Although the potential for legal liability is not a constraint to pro­
viding individual assistance,83 either temperament or conscience 
may be. 
The Draft Code's tacit suggestion that there should be no dis­
crimination in the services rendered to various patrons84 is un­
realistic when close working relationships are involved. A law librar­
ian cannot respond with the same verve to all detailed requests for 
assistance. When providing access to library materials the librarian 
can treat all patrons equally with relative ease; but when the assis­
tance requested involves close oversight of the research, personal 
interaction becomes important. In the same way that an attorney 
may refuse to become counsel for a party,85 the law librarian's in­
dividual prerogatives to refuse analytical assistance to a patron must 
be respected. 
Accepting this limitation on the librarian's obligation to aid 
pro se patrons and recalling the constraint that advice must not be 
given beyond the scope of expertise,86 it becomes apparent that 
the assistance given to individual pro se patrons will vary widely 
from law library to law library and from patron to patron. This 
potential lack of uniformity is a serious problem which is only par­
tially ameliorated by the institutional responses already advocated. 
Although the concern of law librarians has focused on the unequal 
burden on law libraries resulting from varied amounts of available 
82. For a statement from which the "old" role may be inferred, see Begg, supra 
note 4, at 31: "There are several ways to minimize the problems presented by the 
pro se patron.... By far the most effective method for eliminating such problems is 
to exclude these patrons from the library." 
83.. See text accompanying notes 18-40 supra. 
84. See DRAFT CODE, supra note 13, art. III, § 1; art. VII, §§ 2(a) & 2(b) & 4. 
85. A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No.2. 
86. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra. 
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aid,87 a more troublesome problem is the impact of this nonunifor­
mity on pr~ se patrons. Since these potential law library users are 
in part defined by their general lack of legal sophistication, they 
should not be forced to ascertain and evaluate the policies and 
quality of assistance which may be found at various libraries. 88 
At least two solutions to the problem of nonuniformity exist. 
First, library policies and resources can be publicized to facilitate 
comparison. Second, a uniform library response to pro se patrons 
can be required. The latter is the approach advocated, at least in 
part, by the Draft Code. 89 As a long tenn solution, this approach is 
preferable provided it includes express recognition of the compel­
ling need for meaningful pro se law library access90 and simultane­
ously requires sufficiently high standards of competency and train­
ing for law librarians. 91 In the interim, law libraries can easily 
make known their policies regarding pro se patronage and provide 
the introductory materials on legal research as previously advo­
cated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Faretta v. California indirectly forced a redefinition of our 
concept of adequate legal representation. Litigants who choose to 
exercise their pro se right have not forfeited all claims to adequate 
, representation. Although providing pro se patrons with the assis­
tance they need is a task that several sectors of the legal commu­
nity must undertake, law librarians and law libraries must become 
more involved. They are particularly well situated and fairly well 
suited to deliver essential help to pro se litigants in the short run. 
87. Even if nonuniform response resulted in different levels of pro se patron­
age, the affected libraries could simply reduce the level of service if the burden was 
too great. User fees might be charged of all pro se patrons to help defray expense. 
This solution, however, creates a climate in which the previous fears of unauthorized 
practice of law and tort liability are most justified. Begg, supra note 4. See text ac­
companying notes 25 & 34 supra. 
88. To expect a pro se patron to ascertain and meaningfully compare alternative 
sources of law library assistance is unrealistic. They are ill-suited to judge the com­
parative qualifications of the library staff even if such infornlation were available. 
89. DRAFT CODE, supra note 13, art. I, § 2. 
90. Cf, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) ("the fundamental right of 
access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation 
and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law li­
braries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law"). See also text ac­
companying notes 49-65 sllpra. 
91. At a minimum, these standards should include course work in legal bibliog­
raphy, legal research technique, and a substantive course in legal process. 
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If, at any Annual Convention of the American Association of Li­
braries,92 a new Draft Code of Ethics is presented which warns 
against the unauthorized practice of law, a clear definition of re­
search assistance which constitutes such practice should be in­
cluded. More specific guidelines should be adopted to aid law li­
brarians and their staff to determine the proper extent of their 
research efforts. These efforts need not be inhibited by legal doc­
trines forbidding the unauthorized practice of law or imposing tort 
liability for negligent acts. Further, immediate efforts must be 
made to increase the general level of service available to pro se 
patrons while viable long term solutions are developed. Law librar­
ians should direct their efforts and use the considerable resources 
of their libraries to design and implement programs that will meet 
the needs of pro se litigants as a class. If this is done on a large scale, 
law librarians may help to achieve a long term solution to the prob­
lem of making pro se representation at least minimally adequate. 
92. See note 13 supra. 
